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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Anthony Thomas Jr.'s appeal was originally assigned to the Idaho Court
of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction.

See generally State v. Thomas, 2014

Opinion No. 428 (Mar. 27, 2014) (hereinafter, Opinion).

Mr. Thomas seeks review

because the Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to Idaho and United States Supreme
Court precedent, decides an issue of first impression, and is necessary to resolve an
evolving conflict with the Court of Appeals.
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The State charged, and a jury convicted, Mr. Thomas for first-degree mu
his

Beth Irby-Thomas.

of

Mr. Thornas's jury deliberated over the course

days for more than nine hours. The jury asked one question - whether there was any
evidence other than Mr. Thomas's testimony that demonstrated whether Ms. IrbyThomas had previously engaged in erotic asphyxiation. 1

The district court had

erroneously excluded three of Mr. Thomas's witnesses that would have answered the
jury's question and would have allowed them to judge the credibility of Mr. Thomas and
his defense.

Moreover, the State inferred through its case in chief that it had

investigated Ms. lrby-Thomas's sexual behaviors and led the jurors to believe that there
was no evidence to support Mr. Thomas's
error

When applying Idaho's harmless

there is verifiable proof from the jury question that the errors made in this

case contributed to the verdict.

The Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to Idaho

Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court precedent.
Mr. Thomas's case also presents an issue of first impression.

Mr. Thomas

contends that the jury question, behavior, and length of deliberations are important
considerations in the harmless error analysis.

As an issue of first impression, when

there is incontrovertible evidence that the errors contributed to this jury's verdict, should
the appellate court review the case, judge the credibility of witnesses, and decide
whether they believe a jury would render the same decision.

' "Erotic asphyxiation is the practice of depleting oxygen from the brain to enhance
sexual experiences and arousal. This is typically accomplished by collapsing the
carotid artery. Although the terms erotic asphyxiation and autoerotic asphyxiation
originally had differing meanings, they have come to be used interchangeably and were
used as such below." (Opinion, p.2 n.2.)
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This petition for review also

to resolve an evolving conflict with the Court of

about the proper harmless error

to apply. This Court has specifically held

that the test articulated by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) should be utilized
for determining whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of
Appeals has on several occasions applied a different test.

The test articulated by

Chapman requires an appellate court to determine whether the error contributed to the

verdict as opposed to the test that the appellate court is applying wherein it is evaluating
whether the outcome of the trial would be the same absent the error. When utilizing the
proper

found in Chapman, this Couri should find that the denial of Mr. Thomas's

constitutional right to present a meaningful defense and errors excluding evidence
contributed to the verdict.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Rather than repeat the factual and procedural histories of this case that were
previously provided in detail in Mr. Thomas's Appellant's Brief, Mr. Thomas expressly
incorporates herein with this reference his Appellant's Brief including, but not limited to,
the Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings and Argument presented in that
brief. The following details are tailored for issues involving this petition for review.
'The key issue at [Mr. Thomas first degree murder) trial was whether Thomas
murdered his wife by strangulation or whether the victim accidently strangled herself
while engaging in self-erotic asphyxiation."2 (Opinion, p.5.) Mr. Thomas argued to the
Court of Appeals that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the

2

For clarity, the term self-erotic asphyxiation will be used to describe engaging in the
act alone.
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district court

excluded evidence that would have supported his theory of the

case. (Opinion, p.4.) The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred when
it excluded the testimony of Jed Fischer, Karen Cannon, and Laura Schumaker.

Mr. Thomas is not seeking review of the Court of Appeals' proper determination that the
district court erred when it prohibited him from presenting testimony from these
individuals.
Before the district court, Mr. Thomas sought permission to present testimony
from Jed Fischer that Mr. Fischer strangled Ms. Irby-Thomas during sexual intercourse.
(R., pp.888-889.)

Mr. Thomas was able to offer proof of his testimony using the

preliminary

IJV\JCIU

the State

testimony from Jed

Thomas's boyfriend at the time of her death. (R., p.353.) Mr. Fischer and

Ms. lrbyIrby-

Thomas had broken up about two to three weeks prior to her death and had gotten back
to together. (R., pp.354-355.) He testified that the two had been intimate with each
other. (R., p.353.) During sex, Ms. Irby-Thomas requested Mr. Fischer to strangle her
during sex and he complied.

(R., p.361.) Mr. Fischer had used his hands because

Ms. Irby-Thomas had moved his hands up onto her neck during sexual intercourse.
(R., p.361.)

Mr. Fischer strangled Ms. Irby-Thomas in late November 2010 and

February 2011. (R., p.362.) The district court prohibited the testimony finding that it
was irrelevant. (R., pp.1016-1017.)
Mr. Thomas was also able to offer information regarding Karey Cannon's
potential testimony because on July 28, 2011, Detective Fuentes interviewed Karey
Cannon, Ms. Irby-Thomas' long time childhood friend. (R., pp.448-468.) Knowing that
erotic asphyxiation was going to be a potential defense, Detective Fuentes wanted to

4

know from Ms. Cannon about Ms. Irby-Thomas' sexual practices.
Cannon told
during sex.

(R., p.455.)

(R., p.455.)

Fuentes that Ms. Irby-Thomas liked to be "choked out"
When Ms. Irby-Thomas confided in Ms. Cannon about her

sexual practice, Ms. Cannon probably gave Ms. Irby-Thomas a disapproving look and
thus the conversation did not go much further into specifics.

(R., pp.455-456.)

Ms. Cannon also knew that Mr. Thomas was not very sexually satisfying for Ms. IrbyThomas and that he only cared about satisfying his own needs.

(R., p.456.)

Ms. Cannon also knew that Jed Fischer and Ms. Irby-Thomas had engaged in erotic
asphyxiation. (R., p.458.) The district court prohibited the testimony finding that it was
irrelevant. (R., pp.1016-1017.)
Mr. Thomas was

to provide information regarding Laura Schumaker's

potential testimony because the detectives had also interviewed her. (R., pp.888-889.)
Ms. Schumaker would testify that Ms. Irby-Thomas told her that Mr. Thomas would
"choke" her during sex and that Ms. Schumaker told Ms. Irby-Thomas that she did not
think this was a smart idea.

(R., pp.888-889.)

The district court prohibited the

testimony finding that it was irrelevant. (R., pp.1016-1017.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in excluding
testimony from the three witnesses because "[t]he evidence excluded by the district
court would have served to give credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim
engaged in erotic asphyxiation in the past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic
asphyxiation at the time of her death." (Opinion, pp.5-6.) "Evidence that the victim had
previously engaged in erotic asphyxiation directly corroborated Thomas's testimony that
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the victim engaged in this practice and this made the defense's theory of how the victim
died more probable than it would have been without the evidence." (Opinion, pp.5-6.)
At issue, in this petition for review, is not the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
the district court erred in precluded the testimony/evidence, but the Court of Appeals
finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Opinion, pp.6-11.)
Not only did the jurors not hear from Mr. Thomas's three witnesses, it also heard
about about the State's investigative procedures, which left the jurors believing there
was no evidence to support Mr. Thomas's defense. The State presented evidence from
Detective Richard Fuentes explaining that they had to conduct interviews to investigate
"[Ms. Irby-Thomas'] activities and potential sexual

that were known by friends

through this investigation." (Tr., p.823, Ls.20-25.) The State presented no evidence
that they had discovered any evidence to support a claim that Ms. Irby-Thomas had
engaged in this type of sexual practice.
After the presentation of the evidence, the district court read the instructions to
the jury, and the parties gave closing arguments.

(Tr., p.1253, L.6-p.1367, L.19.)

During the jury's deliberation, they sent a note to the court. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-14.) The
note stated, "Did anyone other than Joe lay foundation that Beth was, in fact, into
autoerotic asphyxiation?" (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-14.) The court instructed the jurors to rely
on their own memories of the testimony. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.16-18.)
In a split-decision, the majority found the error to be harmless because "the State
presented overwhelming evidence of Thomas's guilty."

(Opinion, p.6.)

Although

Mr. Thomas did not argue that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, the
majority summarized for several pages the facts that support the jury's verdict.
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(Opinion, pp.6-10.)

Finally, in the last two paragraphs of its analysis, the majority

recognized the errors made in this case.

(Opinion, p.11.) In finding that the district

court erred, the Court of Appeals said,
The evidence excluded by the district court would have served to give
credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in erotic
asphyxiation in the past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic
asphyxiation at the time of her death.
Evidence that the victim had previously engaged in erotic asphyxiation
directly corroborated Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in this
practice and this made the defense's theory of how the victim died more
probable than it would have been without the evidence.
(Opinion, pp.5-6.) Inconsistent with its previous findings, when evaluating whether the
error was harmless, it concluded that
limited.

(Opinion, p.1 ·1.)

value of the

would have

It determined that the error was unimportant in relation to

everything else considered, essentially finding there was overwhelming evidence of
guilt.

(Opinion, pp.6-11.)

In handling the jury question, the majority declared

Mr. Thomas's argument "misguided."

(Opinion, p.11.)

While relying on Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 408 U.S. 275 (1993), and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the
majority concluded that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict. (Opinion,
p.11.)
Mr. Thomas filed a timely petition for rehearing and a brief in support.
Mr. Thomas expressly incorporates herein with this reference his Appellant's Brief In
Support Of Petition For Rehearing. The Idaho Court of Appeals denied the rehearing in
another split decision.

(See Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, attached as

Appendix A.) Mr. Thomas filed a timely petition for review.
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ISSUE
Should this Court grant review, apply the Chapman test to the objected to errors, find
that the errors contributed to the verdict, reverse the judgment of conviction, and
remand for a new trial?
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ARGUMENT
This Court Should Grant Review, Apply The Chapman Test To The Objected To Errors,
Find That The Errors Contributed To The Verdict, Reverse The Judgment Of
Conviction, And Remand For A New Trial
A. Introduction

This Court should grant review because the Court of Appeals has decided an
issue that has never been squarely addressed by this Court, and in doing so, has
decided that issue in a manner that is inconsistent with this Court's precedent. This
Court has never squarely addressed an issue of when the jury asks a specific question
about evidence that was improperly excluded by the district court what type of impact
that question

on the harmless error test.

Additionally, in denying the petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals has
issued an order which demonstrates that it is not following the Perry-Chapman
standard, and instead, is applying an overwhelming evidence of guilt test which has not
been adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court.

Because this error will continue to be

repeated at the Court of Appeals, it is necessary for this Court to accept review.

B.

Standard For Granting Review
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only

"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but ultimately, the decision
of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme
Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered though.
Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors, which must be considered in
evaluating any petition for review:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression;
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Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;
3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;

4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and

5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.

I.AR. 118(b).
Mr. Thomas contends that review should be granted because the Court of
Appeals has decided an issue in a manner that is inconsistent with this Court's
See I.AR. 118(b)(2). Additionally, this Court has not squarely addressed
the

addressed by the

denial

petition for hearing, the Court of Appeals' reasoning demonstrates that this

rt of Appeals.

I.AR. 118(b)(1). Moreover, in its

Court should resolve the evolving conflict by the Court of Appeals and their attempts to
modify the Chapman test adopted by this Court.

C.

The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Inconsistent With Precedent From the Idaho
Supreme Court And the United States Supreme Court
Mr. Thomas asserts that the Idaho Court of Appeals misapplied the harmless

error test. Instead of utilizing the Chapman harmless error test dictated by the Idaho
Supreme Court, to analyze whether the error that was committed in this case
contributed to the verdict, it utilized an "overwhelming evidence of guilt" test. As will be
demonstrated below (in Issue II), when analyzing the error under the proper United
States Supreme Court test identified in Chapman, as the dissent did in this case, the
error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error did contribute to the
verdict.
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In
standard

v. Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified for all future appeals the
employed in appellate review.

v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-228

10). Although the Perry Court could have adopted any of a number of other tests,

utilized by the United States Supreme Court3 in deciding whether an error is harmless, it
chose to use the test provided for in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Perry,

150 Idaho at 22·1 ("In Idaho, the harmless error test established in Chapman is now
applied to all objected-to error."). 4

Perry appears to have recognized that "some

opinions issued after Chapman have employed pre-Chapman phraseology"; however,
dismisses the subsequent opinions by concluding no practical difference exists. Perry,
150Idaho

1

The Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the proper test in last year's opinion
reversing a conviction for first-degree murder, explaining,
Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a constitutional
violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a
reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves "beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained."

State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.) The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear Chapman is the
proper test to be used when evaluating objected-to errors.
In Chapman, the United States Supreme Court rejected a request to hold all
federal constitutional errors harmful.

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22.

The Chapman

Court recognized that not all constitutional errors affect the trial or have any likelihood of
"The [United States Supreme Court] has offered at least three different approaches to
Mitchell, Against "Ovetwhelming" Appellate Activism
judging an error's harm."
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 1335 (1994).
4 The majority in this case recognized that Perry adopted the Chapman test. (Opinion,
p.6.)
3
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changing the result; some errors are just unimportant or insignificant. Id. at 22. Instead
automatic reversal, the Chapman Court required the party benefiting from the error
(the State) to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 24. The error alleged in Chapman involved the
prosecutor's comment on the defendant's silence, as authorized by the California
Constitution, which violated the defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Id. at 19.

The Chapman Court

concluded that the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's silence was not harmless
error beyond a reasonable doubt because it contributed to the verdict. Id. at 25.
In a case somewhat similar to the instant one, the United States Supreme Court
was asked whether a violation of the Confrontation Clause was subject to the Chapman
harmless error test. Delaware v. Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). The error resulted
in the jury not hearing certain evidence because the trial court refused to allow the
defendant to cross-examine a prosecution witness on issues of bias. Id. at 67 4. The
Supreme Court rejected the State's request to require the defendant to demonstrate
that had the error not occurred the outcome would have been different. Id. at 679-680.
Instead, the Court declared that a violation of the Confrontation Clause must focus on
the individual witness. Id. at 680. "[T]he focus of the prejudice inquiry in determining
whether the confrontation right has been violated must be on the particular witness, not
on the outcome of the entire trial." Id. After finding that an error existed, the Court
rejected the defendant's requests for automatic reversal. Id.

Instead, the Court held

that a Confrontation Clause violation would be evaluated under the Chapman harmless
error standard; however, the damaging potential of the cross-examination must be fully
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considered by the reviewing court when evaluating whether the errors contributed to
verdict. Id. at 684.
The Court of Appeals erred in this case because it failed to apply the Chapman
harmless error test. The Opinion itself starts the analysis by providing: "In this case, the
state presented overwhelming evidence of Thomas's guilt." (Opinion, p.6.) The Court
then proceeds to discuss what it believes to be the "[m]ost damning" testimony.
(Opinion, p.6.) The Opinion continues to discuss the overwhelming evidence of guilt
from its view of the facts presented at the trial for the next several pages without any
discussion of the errors that were committed in this case. (Opinion, pp.6-10.)

In one

paragraph, the Court dismisses the errors that were committed in this case finding
the evidence that it would have produced would have been trivial. (Opinion, p.11.) The
Court fails to assume the damaging potential of the evidence being fully realized, and
then evaluate how the evidence, had it been presented, could have contributed to the
verdict.

See Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. at 684.

Had the Court applied the Chapman

harmless error test, it could not have escaped the conclusion that denying Mr. Thomas
the right to present his defense witnesses contributed to the verdict.
Mr. Thomas asks this Court to grant review because the Opinion issued by the
Court of Appeals in this case is contrary to this Court's precedent.

Mr. Thomas will

further explain in Subsection F why the errors committed in this case were not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Special And Important Reasons Exist To Grant Review Because The Court Of
Appeals Addressed An Issue Not Squarely Addressed By This Court
This Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether a jury's
behavior and length of jury deliberations should be considered in a harmless error
analysis.

(See Opinion, p.12 (Gutierrez, CJ., dissenting).) Consistent with principles

outlined in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), this Court should evaluate
whether the error in this case contributed to the verdict of this jury.
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the

Chapman harmless error test and explained why it was inapplicable to errors involving
improper reasonable doubt instructions.

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U

275 (1993).

the Court concluded that some constitutional errors are not amenable to
harmless-error analysis, it reiterated the proper analysis the appellate courts must
engage in concluding that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under

Chapman.

Id. at 279.

"Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on

which 'the jury actually rested its verdict."' Id. (emphasis in the original). The Sullivan
Court explained that,
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that
was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to
support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee.

Id. at 279-80 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986); Clark, 478 U.S at 593
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Pope v. Illinois, 481
(STEVENS, J., dissenting).)

U.S. 497, 509-510 (1987)

The Court then explained that because no verdict has

been rendered when a faulty reasonable doubt instruction is utilized "the entire premise
of Chapman review is simply absent." Id. at 280.
14

Sullivan acknowledged that because

the most a reviewing court could conclude would be that a "jury would
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

found

not that the jury's actual finding of guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the
constitutional error" is insufficient protection of the Sixth Amendment violation to a jury
trial. Id. (emphasis in original). 'The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate
speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State
would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty." Id.
The Court of Appeals sat as the thirteenth juror weighing the evidence and
credibility of witnesses to conclude that it would not have acquitted the defendant,
depriving Mr. Thomas of his constitutional right to a jury trial. It violated

principles

outlined in Sullivan, in concluding that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt by looking to jurors and evidence outside of this jury trial. Mr. Thomas asks this
Court to grant review because this Court has never squarely addressed the question of
whether a jury's behavior and length of jury deliberations should be considered in a
harmless error analysis. (See Opinion, p.12 (Gutierrez, CJ., dissenting).) Mr. Thomas
will further explain in Subsection F why the errors committed in this case were not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

E.

Special And Important Reasons Exist To Grant Review To Resolve The Evolving
Conflict About The Harmless Error Test To Ensure That The Court Of Appeals
Uses Chapman To Evaluate Whether An Error Is Harmless Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Thomas filed a petition for rehearing arguing to the Court of Appeals that it

has failed to follow the Idaho Supreme Court harmless error test. In denying the petition
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re-hearing, the Court

why this Court should

Appeals

the conflict over the harmless error

review

(See Appendix A.)

In a six page written concurrence to deny the petition for hearing, Judge Lansing
wrote that the Chapman harmless error test adopted by the Perry Court does require
the court to reverse a decision "unless the reviewing court is confident 'beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained."' (Appendix, p.2.) However, she noted that the Idaho Supreme Court has
also recognized an "alternative standard ... phrased as whether the reviewing court is
convinced 'beyond reasonable doubt that the result of trial would have been the same
absent the error."' (Appendix, p.2.) Judge Lansing recognized that "If applied literally,
the Chapman 'did not contribute to the verdict' test and the alternative 'same result'
expression of the test call for somewhat different queries to determine whether a trial
error was harmless." (Appendix, p.2.) She then concludes that Perry implied that the
alternative test was really the same test. (Appendix, p.3.)
Judge Lansing goes on to recognize that the United States Supreme Court has
also varied its harmless error analysis over time. (Appendix, p.3.) She wrote,
The United States Supreme Court has also vacillated between an
approach that considers only the likely effect on the jury of the erroneously
admitted or excluded evidence and an approach that focuses, instead, on
the likelihood that the totality of the evidence would have led to the same
result in the absence of the error.
(Appendix, p.3.) In the next few pages of the order Judge Lansing elaborates on the
different analyses the United State Supreme Court have utilized over time. (Appendix
pp.2-6.)

In a footnote, she even recognizes that the United States Supreme Court,

itself, has acknowledged the inconsistent application of the harmless error test and that
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strict and literal application of the test may lead to different conclusions. (Appendix, p.4,
)

Both in the opinion and in the denial of hearing, the majority utilizes Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), to conclude that overwhelming evidence of guilt is the

proper test.

Neder, however, is inapplicable to the question at hand.

In Neder, the

United States Supreme Court was asked "whether, and under what circumstances, the
omission of an element from the judge's charge to the jury can be harmless error." Id.
at 7. The defendant wanted the error exempted from the Chapman harmless error test
for reasons identified in Sullivan. Id.

at 10-11.

The Neder Court found that the

"omission of an element" could be subject to the Chapman

Id. at 15. When an

omitted element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence,
erroneous instruction is found to be harmless because under Chapman the error did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.

Id. at 17.

In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court

recognized that faulty jury instructions will generally require reversal except when the
error involves one missing element and that element was both uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.

Neder does not

support the Court of Appeals' decision that the proper test is whether a rational jury
would reach the same conclusion.
Judge Lansing concludes by applying the "same result" test to determine that,
had the jury heard the three witnesses that supported Mr. Thomas's defense and
credibility, it would still not have believed Mr. Thomas and would have rendered the
same result. (Appendix, p.7.)
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In a two page written dissent to the order denying Mr. Thomas's petition
, Judge Gutierrez would
harmless error standard is disputed."

the "applicable
(Appendix, p.7.)

Both Judges Gutierrez and

Lansing recognize that there are conflicting tests and the application of those tests
would render different results. (See Appendix A.)
Mr. Thomas asks this Court to grant review to resolve the evolving conflict
regarding the proper application of the harmless error test.

Mr. Thomas will further

explain in Subsection F why the errors committed in this case were not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Errors Committed In This Case Were Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt And This Court Should Vacate The Judgment
Mr. Thomas contends that the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt regardless of what interpretation of the harmless error test this Court adopts.
Because there was a timely objection, Mr. Thomas only has the duty to prove that an
error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot
show that "the error[s] complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 59 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at

24.)
'The key issue at [Mr. Thomas' first degree murder] trial was whether Thomas
murdered his wife by strangulation or whether the victim accidently strangled herself
while engaging in self-erotic asphyxiation." (Opinion, p.5.) The jury deliberated for over
nine hours. (Tr., p.1367, Ls.18-22, R., pp.1199, 1368-1369, see also Opinion, pp.12-14,
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CJ, dissenting.))

During the deliberations, the jury asked the court the

question, "Did anyone other than Joe lay foundation that Beth

in fact, into

autoerotic asphyxiation?" (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-15.)
A proper application of the controlling case law requires the appellate courts to
look

this jury and determine whether the error would have affected this jury's

determination. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-280. "Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee,
the question it instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the
constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but
rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand." Id. at 279. "To
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered
inescapable the findings to support the verdict might be

no matter how

would violate the jury-trial

guarantee." Id.
The jurors that sat in this case were all qualified, both counsel and the court
determined that each of them were unbiased, and after being selected they were sworn
to follow the law. To imply now that the juror or jurors who asked a question about
evidence that should have been admitted in this case is unreasonable calls into
question the fairness of the entire proceeding because this Court has deemed either
one or all of the members of this jury to be unreasonable. Either we take the jurors that
sat in this case and give weight to their questions and find that the errors committed in
this case did contribute to the verdict or we find the jurors were unqualified to sit on the
jury and grant Mr. Thomas a new trial. We have tangible evidence in this case that the
errors committed did in fact contribute to this verdict in this case.

19

The jury found it important enough to stop deliberations and ask the court the
evidence
question.

if it would have been admitted, could have answered their

(Tr., p.1368, Ls.9-20.)

The jury question went to an ultimate issue in

controversy, whether to believe Mr. Thomas in that he did not kill Ms. Irby-Thomas and
conclude that she injured herself.

The jurors were weighing in on Mr. Thomas's

credibility.
The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in excluding testimony
from the three witnesses because "[t]he evidence excluded by the district court would
have served to give credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in erotic
asphyxiation in the past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic asphyxiation at
the time of her death."

(Opinion, pp.5-6.)

"Evidence that the victim had previously

engaged in erotic asphyxiation directly corroborated Thomas's testimony that the victim
engaged in this practice and this made the defense's theory of how the victim died more
probable than it would have been without the evidence." (Opinion, pp.5-6.)
The State had presented evidence that they looked into Ms. Irby-Thomas' sexual
practices. (Tr., p.823, Ls.20-25.) However, they did not present any evidence that she
engaged in this conduct; and the defense was prohibited from doing so. (R., pp.616617, 881-882, 1016-1017.)

The jurors were left with the belief that no evidence

confirmed Mr. Thomas' testimony. The jurors were considering Mr. Thomas' defense as
is evidenced by their jury question. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-14.) The jurors wanted to know
if Ms. Irby-Thomas engaged in erotic asphyxiation, and were told to rely on their own
memories.

(Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-18.)

However, there was no evidence other than

Mr. Thomas' testimony because the district court refused to allow Mr. Thomas to
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the

testimony from Jed Fischer, Karey Cannon, and Laura
The State will

to

nr-r,-,-,,.A

the error in this case was

harmless.
The precluded evidence was relevant to Mr. Thomas' defense. It was relevant to
how Ms. Irby-Thomas injured herself.

It was consistent with the testimony

provided by Mr. Thomas and was the question at issue before the jury. The failure to
admit the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Perry, 150

Idaho at 227, see also, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
What the Court of Appeals has done in its analysis is weighed the evidence
presented at the trial, sitting as

thirteenth juror,

concluded that, had it

the

excluded evidence, it would not have rendered an acquittal. This is not the test dictated
by Chapman or the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals lacks the benefit of
being able to judge the credibility of the witnesses. And as the Court of Appeals did
conclude, "The evidence excluded by the district court would have served to give
credence to Thomas's testimony that the victim engaged in erotic asphyxiation in the
past and that the victim was engaged in self-erotic asphyxiation at the time of her
death." (Opinion, p.5.) The error in this case had a direct impact on the credibility
determination of the witnesses testifying at trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Thomas

Chapman

that this

grant review,

the

to the objected to errors, find that the errors contributed to the verdict,

reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED this 23 rd day of June, 2014.

EM. WALK R
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
JOSEPH ANTHONY THOMAS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Court has received and reviewed the appellant's petition and brief for rehearing.
After due consideration, the petition is hereby DENIED.
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cc:
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Ill

Judge LANSING, CONCURRING IN THE ORDER
I write to explain why I disagree with Thomas's analysis of the hannless error standard
presented in his brief in support of the petition for rehearing.
As Thomas points out, in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court adopted the standard that was stated by the United States Supreme Court in

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for harmless error review. The Chapman standard
requires reversal unless the reviewing court is confident "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24. The Perry Court held
that this standard would henceforth be applied to all objected-to error. Peny, 150 Idaho at 221,
245 P.3d at 973. The Perry decision recognized that Idaho appellate courts had sometimes
employed "pre-Chapman phraseology" when stating the applicable standard, as in State v.

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,265, 923 P.2d 966, 972 (1996), where the query was phrased as whether
"the evidence of the defendant's guilt is proven and is such as ordinarily produces moral
certainty or conviction in an unprejudiced mind, and the result would not have been different had
an error in the trial not been committed." See Perry, 150 Idaho at 221-22, 245 P.3d at 973-74.
This alternative standard was also sometimes phrased as whether the reviewing court is
convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of trial would have been the same absent
the error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). Accord

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 PJd 414, 436 (2009); State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho
588, 592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 368, 972 P.2d 737, 746
(Ct. App. 1998).
If applied literally, the Chapman "did not contribute to the verdict" test and the
alternative "same result" expression of the test call for somewhat different queries to detennine
whether a trial error was harmless. That is, the Chapman language focuses on the effect that the
erroneously admitted or excluded evidence could have had on the jury, while the "same result"
test focuses on the effect of the untainted evidence, i.e., whether it would have led the jury to the
same verdict if the error had not occurred. In Perry, our Supreme Court concluded, however,

2

that the alternative phraseology "is so similar analytically to the standard employed under

Chapman, that there is no practical difference." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222,245 P.3d at 974.
While purporting to apply only the Chapman test, the United States Supreme Court has
also vacillated between an approach that considers only the likely effect on the jury of the
eIToneously admitted or excluded evidence and an approach that focuses, instead, on the
likelihood that the totality of the evidence would have led to the same result in the absence of the
error.

In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), after finding that the defendant's

confrontation rights had been violated, the Supreme Court described the proper ham1less errnr

analysis as follows:
Whether such an error is hannless in a particular case depends upon a host of
factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the
prosecution's case.

Id at 684. Thus, the Supreme Court endorsed examining the weight and significance of the
remaining evidence, not just the subjective effect that the eIToneously excluded evidence might
have had on the jury, in conducting a harmless error analysis. 1

In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that the Chapman
test is not "whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support" a conviction but
"whether the State has proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict."' Id at 258-59 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). But in Harrington
v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969), while expressly confirming that the Chapman test is

appropriate, the Court held that an error was harmless because the untainted evidence of guilt
was "overwhelming." Justice Brennan, dissenting, asserted that the majority opinion thereby

Thomas relies upon Van Arsdall to support his contention that this Court misapplied the
Chapman test, but the language he quotes is not from the section of the Van Arsdall opinion that
describes the harmless error standard. Rather, it is from the opinion's analysis of what must be
shown in order to establish that the confrontation right has been violated.
3
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"shit1[ed] the inquiry from whether the constitutional error contributed to the conviction to
whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming' support for the conviction," id at 255,
and that this approach "was expressly rejected in Chapman." Id at 256. Justice Brennan stated
that the majority's inquiry "concerns the extent of accumulation of untainted evidence" while his
inquiry concerns "the impact of tainted evidence on the jury's decision." Id at 256. 2
Also of significance is the harmless error discussion in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391
(1991), disapproved on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). After holding
that the trial court erred in giving an instruction that allowed the jury to presume malice from the
use of a deadly weapon, the Supreme Court's description of the applicable harmless error

analysis included the fi)llowing:
To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that
error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in
question, as revealed in the record. Thus, to say that an instruction to apply an
unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict is to make a

2

As Justice Brennan's dissent in Harrington illustrates, strict and literal application of the
two expressions of the test can lead to different conclusions as to whether the trial error was
harmless. An illustrative circumstance where different conclusions may be dictated by the
different emphases of the two tests is posited in Linda E. Carter, The Sporting Approach to
Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: The Supreme Court's "No Harm, No Foul" Debacle in
Neder v. United States, 28 Am. J. Crim. L. 229,243 (2001):
Suppose that there is a rape-murder prosecution in which the evidence admitted at
trial includes: the defendant's DNA, found at the scene of the crime; his
fingerprints, found everywhere at the scene; the fact that he was the victim's
estranged husband and jealous of her relationship with another man; the fact that
he had threatened her; and his confession to the crime. Now assume that, on
appeal, the confession is found to be unconstitutionally coerced. If the question is
whether there is enough evidence without the confession to conclude that the jury
would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the answer is
probably yes. If, however, the question is whether the erroneously admitted
confession contributed to the verdict in a significant way, it is much more difficult
to conclude that the error was harmless. The confession was probably a highly
important piece of evidence to the jury, as the defendant's own words. In that
case, the confession most certainly "contributed" to the verdict, even though there
is a significant amount of properly admitted evidence.
4

judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when
measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of
the presumption.

[T]he issue under Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on
evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt,
independently of the presumption. Since that enquiry cannot be a subjective one
into the jurors' minds, a court must approach it by asking whether the force of the
evidence presumably considered by the Jwy in accordance with the instructions is
so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting
on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the presumption. It
is only when the effect of the pn:sumption is comparatively minimal to this
degree that it c,m be said, in Chapman's words, that the presumption did not
contribute to the verdict rendered.
Yates, 500 U.S. at 404-05 (emphasis added). "TTms, in Yates, the Court was clearly examining

whether a rational jury would undoubtedly have rendered the same verdict in the absence of the
error.
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), it appears that the Court sought to
harmonize the two tests and treat them as the same inquiry. The Court there asserted that it was
applying the Chapman test "because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact
rendered--no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be--would violate
the jury-trial guarantee," but the Court then went on to note that the correct inquiry is "whether
the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the
constitutional error." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-80. The Court reconciled the two tests by
explaining that the question is not whether, "a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt" but whether "the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error." Id. at 280.
Then in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999), the Court, still purporting to apply
the Chapman test, stated the relevant inquiry as: "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" (Emphasis added.) The

Court concluded in that case that the evidence on an element of the offense that had been omitted
from the jury instructions was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence such that

5
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"the jmy verdict would have been the same absent the error." Therefore, the Comi said, it was
"beyond cavil here that the error 'did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Id. at 17 (quoting

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). In arriving at this decision, the Court stated that this type of harmless
error review does not infringe the defendant's right to have his guilt determined by a jury:

A reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry does not, as Justice
Traynor put it, "become in effect a second jury to determine whether the
defendant is guilty." Rather, a court, in typical appellate-co mt fashion, asks
whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary
finding with respect to the omitted element. If the answer to that question is "no,"
holding the error harmless does not "reflec[t] a denigration of the constitutional
rights involved."
Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 (internal citations omitted).

Hence, in Neder, the Court applied an

objective test, asking what verdict would have been rendered by a rational jury if the error had
not occurred. See also Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212,213 (2006) (following the Neder

approach); 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMJNAL

PROCEDURE

§ 27.6(e) (3d ed. 2007)

(observing that the most recent United States Supreme Court opinions follow the approach of
"asking what the outcome would have been had the trial error not occurred" rather than applying
the Chapman test "assessing the effect of the error on the trial that took place"); Brent M. Craig,

"What Were They Thinking? "--A Proposed Approach to Harmless Error Analysis, 8 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (asserting that the United States Supreme Court has 'jump[ed]

around; at times using the pure Chapman test of whether the constitutional error contributed to
the verdict, and at other times appl[ying] the Harrington test of whether, notwithstanding the
error, there was overwhelming evidence to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt").

In light of the United States Supreme Court's continued use of the "same result" test
rather than a literal application of the Chapman language in its most recent decisions, I conclude
that the Chapman hannless error standard does not require reversal if the reviewing court can
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury's finding of guilt "would surely not have
been different absent the ... error." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280.
I also find support for that conclusion in Idaho Supreme Court decisions. In Perry, the

Supreme Court said that the two analytical approaches are so similar "that there is no practical
6
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difference." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974. Subsequently, in State v. Almaraz, 154
Idaho 584, 598, 30 I P.3d 242,256 (2013), the Court said that upon a finding of evidentiary error,
"the Court must declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the
outcome of the trial, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible. In other
words, the enor is hannless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the
error." Id (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the majority opinion in this case was incorrect in its
harmless error analysis which focused lasgely upon whether, if the eIToncously excluded
evidence had been admitted, a reasonable jury viewing the totality of the evidence could have
reached a different verdict.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ, DISSENTING li'ROM THE ORDER
I respectfully dissent from the order of the Court denying Thomas's petition for
rehearing.

I would grant the petition for rehearing because the applicable harmless error

standard is disputed.
Judge Lansing's articulate concurrence demonstrates why Thomas's petition for
rehearing should be granted. As the concurrence enunciates, the United States Supreme Court
has, thus far, not consistently articulated the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
harmless error analysis. Even the Idaho Supreme Court has provided seemingly inconsistent
standards in State v. Parker, Docket No. 38956 (Apr. 4, 2014), petition for reh 'g filed, a case
decided after we issued our decision in this appeal. Moreover, it is not apparent from the
majority opinion in Thomas's appeal which standard the majority applied because the majority
cites and quotes the Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), interpretation of Chapman
harmless error, but later references Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Therefore, I
would grant the petition for rehearing to address the proper formulation of the harmless error
analysis.
Judge Lansing proposes that "the Chapman harmless error standard does not require
reversal if the reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury's
finding of guilt 'would surely not have been different absent the ... error'" (quoting Sullivan,
7

Ill

error
analysis, I would still hold that the Court cannot conclude beyond a
rational jury's verdict would surely not have been difterent if

that a
were admitted. This

is because a rational juP/ would have to make a credibility determination concerning Thomas's
testimony--the main issue at trial--based on the additional evidence that would have added
veracity to Thomas's testimony.
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